Tigers in tangle for AL Central title

The Detroit Tigers are trying to win the American League Central division for the fourth straight time, and this one isn't as easy as some of the others. They still hit as well as just about anyone and they still catch it worse than anyone, but their trademark pitching is way down. Now, they're trying to hold off the Kansas City Royals in the last two weeks of the season.

Justin Verlander isn't a Cy Young Award contender this year, and the Detroit Tigers aren't a shoo-in to win the American League Central division (SD Dirk/Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic license).

By BILL PETERSON
Big Leagues in Los Angeles

Nobody saw a championship race coming in the American League Central division, where the Detroit Tigers, going for their fourth straight title, held a seven-game lead on July 24. This division was on cruise control.

That was almost two months ago. Friday, the Tigers go to Kansas City fighting for their postseason lives. The Tigers hold a mere half-game lead over the Kansas City Royals as those clubs begin three games that might decide the division if the Tigers sweep, and, otherwise, won't. A week of games will follow the series, and any other outcome than a Tigers sweep would keep the margin between these clubs within three games. The way this season has gone, though, the Tigers wouldn't be comfortable even if they do sweep.

What happened? Tigers fans often can be found bemoaning that their favorites should have won five or six more games by now. Looking at the Tigers, it would appear they have done everything right, by the book, at least, entering this season.

They had their big arm, Justin Verlander, signed for the long term. They, apparently, improved themselves defensively by trading first baseman Prince Fielder to the Texas Rangers for second baseman Ian Kinsler so they could move Miguel Cabrera to first base, where he figured to be less of a defensive liability. They had a rookie, Nick Castellanos, ready for third base. They had to figure that replacing departed free agent Jhonny Peralta at shortstop at least wouldn't hurt defensively. They brought in Rajai Davis to play left field. They signed a successful closer, Joe Nathan, to solve that problem they've long had with finishing out leads. Of course, they have Victor Martinez, who is close to being the best designated hitter in the American League.

Above all that, they "won" the Fielder-Kinsler trade, though in the most unfortunate possible way, due to Fielder's serious neck problems. And who could top that starting rotation? Even after trading Doug Fister to the Washington Nationals last winter, which wasn't one of their better ideas, they still had Verlander, Max Scherzer, Anibal Sanchez, Rick Porcello and Drew Smyly. And they held a seven-game lead on July 24. Then, at the trading deadline, they nabbed the big prize on that market, bringing in left-hander David Price from the Tampa Bay Rays.

Know what else? They enter Friday's first game in Kansas City having defeated the Royals in 11 of their 16 meetings.

And, yet, the Tigers have been unable to shake the Royals. They have been unable to run out there for the last two months and win their solid four games per week that would enable them to maintain the comfortable lead. On July 24, the Tigers were 57-42. Since then, they are 27-26.

For all that the Tigers have put into making themselves better, they are a long way short of being an imposing club right now.

Defensively, they are even worse than last year, when they finished at minus-57 fielding zone runs above average. This year, with 10 games left, they are at minus-89, which means they give away more than half of a run per game defensively. Just looking at defensive runs saved, the Tigers are down significantly at many positions.

At first base and second base, the Tigers are improved defensively. Last year, Fielder was minus-13 in defensive runs saved at first base. This year, Cabrera is even (zero). At second base, they've improved from Omar Infante's minus-five to Kinsler's plus-16. But Cabrera was minus-18 at third base last year and Castellanos is minus-30 there now. At short, Peralta was even (zero) last year and the Tigers haven't found anyone better this year than Andrew Romine (minus-2). In left field, Andy Dirks was plus-eight last year. This year, Davis was minus-15 there, then they moved him to center field, where he is minus-three. Right fielder Torii Hunter has declined from minus-10 last year to minus-19 this year.

The Tigers were weak defensively last year, but their pitching staff papered over some of that by striking out 1,428 batters, most in the league. The Tigers last year also had the second-best ERA-plus in the league at 116. This year, the Tigers have a mediocre pitching staff with a 100 ERA-plus and they are way down to sixth in AL strikeouts at 1,170, just a tick better than the league average of 1,158. So, the Tigers defend terribly, and they don't have the pitching to hide that.

Individually, certain Tigers pitchers have been disappointing, particularly the guys at the front and back of their staff. Verlander is the fifth-best starter they have this year at 13-12 with a 4.81 ERA. Nathan is no better than the Jose Valverde of late 2012, running a 5.20 ERA. He has 32 saves, but he also has blown 10 saves (though he did come back and win two of those games).

Fans might think the Tigers should have won five or six more games by now, but the club's Pythagorean disagrees. The Tigers are 84-68 and their Pythagorean says they should be 81-71. Not much of a club. Good hitting (still), but also terrible defense (still). The difference is in the pitching, which has declined from near league leadership to middle of the pack.

So, the Royals don't need to be fantastic to jump into this thing, and they aren't. They are pitching and defense – third in the AL with a 114 ERA-plus and second only to Baltimore in defensive runs saved (36).

The Royals are good fun defensively. Their manager, Ned Yost, has said he might have a half-dozen Gold Gloves, and he's not far from wrong. The top candidates might be outfielders Lorenzo Cain (20 defensive runs saved), Alex Gordon (24), Jarrod Dyson (16) and catcher Salvador Perez (eight). Shortstop Alcides Escobar is a good defender, though his minus-three doesn't say so. First baseman Eric Hosmer is plus-two and Infante at second base is plus-one. Even their worst defenders aren't too bad. Third baseman Mike Moustakas is minus-two and right fielder Nori Aoki is minus-seven (though his fielding zone runs above average is plus-two).

When a ball club doesn't beat itself defensively, we shouldn't be surprised that it wins. Obviously, that defense supports terrific pitching. Leading the rotation are veteran James Shields (14-7, 3.15) and 25-year-old left-hander Danny Duffy (8-11, 2.42). The other starters – Jeremy Guthrie, Jason Vargas and Yordano Ventura – are solid. The back three pitchers in the bullpen are much more than solid. Kelvin Herrera destroys the seventh inning for opposing hitters with a fastball that touches 100 miles per hour, Wade Davis is an eighth-inning guy with a 0.94 ERA and Greg Holland has a 1.54 ERA and 42 saves as the closer.

The Royals will go as far as the hitting takes them, which often isn't very far, but often enough is. For the season, the Royals are 11th in the AL in all three short-slash categories (.312/.375/.687) and they are ninth in runs with 610. They are 15th with 93 homers.

They do have some upsides, however. When the Royals have it working offensively, they are something in the mold of the Angels. They walk (358) and strike out (909) fewer times than any other club in the AL. They keep it moving, though, going third in league batting average (.261) and leading the league with 142 stolen bases (in 175 attempts, an .811 percentage). The AL is successful only 73 percent of the time on steals.

It's often said in sports that when your team isn't scoring, defense keeps you in it. But when the Royals don't score, they are so tepid that not even their pitching and defense can make it work.

Through May 28, for example, the Royals ran a long slash of .251/.306/.348/.654 with only 21 homers in those 58 games, and they were 24-28. During the next three weeks, they went on an offensive tear, slashing .290/.340/.440/.781 with 18 homers in 19 games, during which they were 15-4. The Royals won the last 10 of those games, the last three of them against the Tigers, including wins of 11-8 and 11-4. They took a 1 1/2 game lead in the division.

Then, the Kansas City offense went to sleep again. From June 19 through July 21, the Royals slashed .264/.307/.371/.679 with 16 homers in those 27 games, during which they were 9-18. They fell to third place in the AL Central, eight games down to the Tigers.

From July 22 through Aug. 27, we saw a slight offensive rally, though the pitching staff really had more to do with their 26-8 run that put them back into a 2 1/2 game division lead. The hitters slashed .264/.309/.400/.709 with 29 homers in those 34 games. The pitchers were terrific during that run, tossing a 2.90 ERA.

From Aug. 29 through now, the Royals hitters are back to not hitting, throwing a slash of .242/.307/.339/.647. The club is 9-10 during the run, losing 3 1/2 games to the Tigers. The pitching during that run has held steady with a 2.95 ERA.

We have, here, two mirror opposite clubs. The Tigers hit it, but they don't pitch it or catch it. The Royals pitch it and catch it. Sometimes, though, they also hit it. When they do, they win.

It makes forecasting this outcome rather a form proposition. If the Royals hit during these last 11 games of the season, they will prevail. If they don't, it's the Tigers. Again. Barely.

The Angels according to WAR

The statistical confection known as Wins Above Replacement (WAR) has become something of a new religion among a certain strain of baseball fans. As such, it requires a leap of faith, which some of us aren't quite willing to take. Here's what WAR says about the Angels in 2013.

According to WAR, Angels pitchers are considerably better than they were last season, and Scott Downs, in particular, is about five times as good (Keith Allison/Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 2.0 Generic license).


By BILL PETERSON
Big Leagues in Los Angeles

The Angels have become a dangerous team since this season's terrible start, which was even worse than last year's terrible start. It remains that, at 43-45, they are well behind the pace of last year's outfit, which finished 89-73. At the rate that the Angels have won through their first 88 games, they would finish 79-83.

Again, though, the Angels started this year 15-27. Since then, they are 28-18. If they can keep playing at that 28-18 pace (a .609 percentage), they would finish 88-74, which gets them very close to the present pace for the Tampa Bay Rays, who are 50-40 and positioned for the second wild card at 90-72.

The question before us is this: Considering that the Angels, taking the first 88 games in total, are paced to finish ten games worse than they finished last year, what is that difference? How, specifically, are the Angels ten games behind last year's rate of victory?

Like many other commentators, we're intrigued by Wins Above Replacement (WAR) as a way to measure specific player contributions to winning games. Unlike many of those same commentators, who talk as though WAR should be the last word on important questions like a player's worthiness for the Hall of Fame or a Most Valuable Player award, we're not sold on WAR. We're still kicking the tires and checking under the hood.

A check under the hood involves a critique of the methodology, a critical look at the assumptions involved in working out the formula for determining WAR. Tire kicking involves putting certain questions to WAR and seeing how it answers. What follows is an exercise in tire kicking.

Baseball-reference.com (insert deep bow here) bases WAR on the assumption that a team composed entirely of "replacement" players, players of the "4A" type who are easily available to every team, would win 48 games in a 162-game major league season. Thus, a team that wins 90 games in a season would have 42 games of WAR value -- the 48 games that a team full of replacements would win, plus 42 "wins above replacement."

One legitimate criticism of WAR is that it misses by a little. One of WAR's virtues is that it doesn't miss by much. But it does miss by enough to be questionable. For example, as the Angels won 89 games last year, we would expect their WAR to total 41. Instead, by the Baseball-reference.com version of WAR, it totaled 46.3. If the Angels had won at the rate that WAR would predict, they would have finished with 94 wins, which would have put them into the playoffs. In the world according to WAR, the Oakland Athletics would have won 95 instead 94, the Texas Rangers would have won the same 93 and the Baltimore Orioles would have won 87 instead of 93. So, the Angels would have been in and the Orioles would have been out.

That's a pretty different world. So, WAR raises at least as many questions about itself as it answers about player value, and that should be kept in mind as we put it to work. It's a long way from being perfected.

It's also a lot of fun. So, back to the fun. Let's look at the Angels.

So far in 2013, Angels pitchers have produced 6.6 WAR, which works out to 12.2 WAR over 162 games. As it happens, Angels pitchers produced 4.8 WAR for all of last season. If WAR is to be believed, then Angels pitchers actually are better this year than last year, even though they rank 11th in American League ERA this year (4.23) and they ranked eighth last year (4.02).

At the end of last season, the Angels let go of Dan Haren (-0.4 WAR in 2012) and Ervin Santana (-1.3) and, essentially, replaced them with Jason Vargas and Joe Blanton. Vargas, with a 1.9 WAR so far this year, projects out to about 3.7 WAR over a full season, though we know we're not getting that because he'll miss about six weeks with a blood clot. Blanton has a -0.4 WAR, which works out to about -0.8 over the full season. Between Vargas and Blanton, the Angels would realize about 3.0 WAR over the full season, an improvement of 4.7 WAR over the combination of Haren and Santana in 2012.

C.J. Wilson finished with 0.7 WAR last year and now has 1.3 WAR in 2013, which would take him to about 2.5 over the full season. That's an upgrade of 1.8 WAR. Jered Weaver last year had 4.0 WAR and, so far this year, has 1.4 WAR, which would get him to about 2.8 over the full season. But Weaver is the reverse side of Vargas in that the former already has been injured and we might expect him to outpace the WAR he has established so far. The way Weaver is going lately, he might match last year's 4.0.

Last year, the Angels brought in Zach Greinke as a short timer and he gave them 1.4 WAR. He's pitching across town now and the Angels don't have an obvious replacement. However, Jerome Williams is good enough for WAR purposes. Last season, Williams totaled -0.2 WAR. This year, so far, he is 0.6, which rates out to about 1.2. That's an improvement of 1.4, which was precisely Greinke's contribution last season.

Ernesto Frieri last year totaled 1.4 WAR and he has 0.9 WAR so far this year, so he would come in around 1.8 for a small increase. But Scott Downs is showing a big increase, up from 0.4 WAR last year to 1.2 so far this season. He would pace out to about 2.4 WAR this year, a full two games better for a situational left-handed reliever. Even Garrett Richards works out better this season. Last year, he finished with -1.0 WAR and this year he projects to about -0.2 WAR.

Taking the next five Angels pitchers by appearances in 2013, we find Michael Kohn (0.7 so far), Kevin Jepsen (-0.0), Dane De La Rosa (0.5), Robert Coello (0.0) and Sean Burnett (0.6). They total 1.8, which would bring them in around 3.5. Compare them with the Angels next five pitchers from 2012 in appearances: Jason Isringhausen (0.1 in 2012), Jepsen (0.4), Jordan Walden (0.3), LaTroy Hawkins (0.0) and Hisanori Takahashi (-0.3). They total 0.5. So, the Angels, considering the solid back of their staff, are about 3.0 WAR better than last year.

Assuming that the discrepancies involving Weaver and Vargas will come out in the wash, the body of pitchers so far considered would come in right about 12 WAR better than last year. As to the remaining pitchers from each year, the guys who come and go, the Angels are about two WAR worse in 2013.

Position play, WAR tells us, is where the Angels really suffer this year in comparison with 2012. Defensively, in particular, WAR tells us exactly what the eye tells us. The Angels are ghastly this year. In 2012, they totaled 4.6 defensive WAR. In 2013, they are -4.7 WAR, which comes to about -9.0 over the full season. Perhaps WAR is telling us something about the relationship between pitching and defense, because the common measures tell us that the Angels pitching is worse this year, while WAR tells us that the pitching actually is better and it's the defense that's worse.

Offensively, WAR tells us that the Angels are a little worse than last year. Their offensive WAR last year was 36.7 and their offensive WAR so far this year is 17.1, which paces out to about 33. The less mysterious measurements tell us that that the Angels are more than a little worse offensively this year. The Angels are down from third in the league to seventh in runs, down from third to fifth in OPS and their OPS-plus is down from 116 to 111.

The big differences are found in individual position players, where we see enormous declines in WAR. That 12-game improvement in WAR among the pitchers is much more than offset by a projected decline of about 20 WAR among the position players.

Erick Aybar last year was 4.3 WAR and he's 0.2 WAR so far in 2013, so he paces out to a four-game WAR drop. Alberto Callaspo has dropped from 3.5 WAR to 0.0 WAR, so his decline is that large. By letting go of Torii Hunter, who had a 5.8 WAR last year, and replacing him with Josh Hamilton, who is 0.2 this year, the Angels figure to be another five WAR in the red. Albert Pujols did 5.0 WAR last year and he's 0.8 so far in 2013, a drop of about 3.5 over the full season. Mike Trout has followed last year's incredible 10.9 WAR with 3.9 so far this year. He paces out to about 7.7 WAR in 2013, another drop of three games. Were these players to maintain their WAR levels, they would end up being about 20 WAR worse in 2013 than 2012.

All of that is somewhat offset by improvements from other players. Howie Kendrick, who finished last year with 3.1 WAR, already has 2.8 in 2013 and would come in around 5.5, an increase of about 2.5 games. Chris Iannetta finished 1.4 in 2013 and already has 1.3 in 2013, so he figures to come in about 2.5, an increase of about one game. Peter Bourjos last year had 1.2 WAR and he has 1.3 already this year, so he would be about 1.2 better over this full season, except that he can't stay in the lineup. Mark Trumbo, 2.7 WAR last year, is 1.5 so far this year, so he would come out about the same. So, we see an improvement of about five WAR in 2013 among these players.

But when we go to the secondary position players, we see mostly decline. The next five Angels position players by appearance in 2012 were Kendrys Morales (2.2), Maicer Izturis (0.3), Vernon Wells (0.6), Bobby Wilson (0.9) and John Hester (-0.1). They total up to 3.9 WAR in 2012. The next five of those players for 2013 are J.B. Shuck (0.3), Brendan Harris (-0.6), Hank Conger (1.0), Luis Jimenez (-0.0) and Andrew Romine (-0.3). They add up to 0.4, which paces out to about 0.8, another drop of three games from the comparable players of 2012.

Putting it all together, WAR tells us that the Angels, over 162 games, would be going on four games worse offensively (down from 36.7 WAR in 2012 to about 33 this year), about seven or eight games better in their pitching (up from 4.8 to 12.2) and about 14 games worse defensively (down from 4.6 to about -9.0). That accounts, give or take, for the 10-game difference to the bad this year for the Angels.

Outside of WAR's suggestion here that pitching really isn't the Angels' problem, which is a little surprising, this quick and dirty study supports much of what we can plainly see by quantifing our qualitative intuitions. We could already tell that Hamilton instead of Hunter has turned out to be a bad exchange. WAR gives us an inkling of how bad. We could already see that Pujols, Callaspo and Aybar aren't as good as they were last year. WAR gives us some purchase on the extent of those declines.

In some respects, though, we're finding WAR quite hard to believe. WAR tells us that Trout is -1.3 defensively in 2013. Really? This season, the Angels are 10th in American League ERA by starters at 4.43, compared with fifth last year at 4.04. But WAR would have us believe that they get better starts this season. According to WAR, the Angels are a couple of wins better behind the plate this year. That isn't obvious.

WAR certainly is a salty concoction. It makes our discussions, like our food, tastier and more interesting, in the right amounts. In excess, it causes thirst, bloating, high blood pressure and weakening of the bones (osteoporosis), which might also characterize a good many baseball arguments that take WAR as gospel. Perhaps, WAR should be taken with a grain of salt. Doesn’t mean we shouldn’t use it. But it’s not a good main course.

Zimmermann stops another good lineup: Nats 3, Tigers 1

Jordan Zimmermann might be the hottest pitcher in big league baseball. He shut down a potent lineup for the third straight time Wednesday, leading the Washington Nationals to a 3-1 win against the Detroit Tigers. Zimmermann now is 6-1 with a 1.59 ERA.

Washington Nationals pitcher Jordan Zimmermann has rifled through the lineups of the Cincinnati Reds, Atlanta Braves and Detroit Tigers in his last three starts (Keith Allison/Creative Commons).


By BILL PETERSON
Big Leagues in Los Angeles

The Game: May 8, Detroit Tigers at Washington Nationals, interleague. Detroit entered 19-11, first place AL Central, 1 1/2 games ahead of Kansas City. Washington entered 17-15, second place NL East, two games behind Atlanta.

The pitchers: Detroit, Anibal Sanchez (3-2, 1.82). Washington,  Jordan Zimmermann (5-1, 1.64).

The result: Washington 3, Detroit 1

Summary: Zimmermann survived a sketchy first three innings and lasted seven, allowing seven hits and two walks for the win. He improved his record to 6-1 with a 1.59 ERA. Bryce Harper hit a solo homer and a sacrifice fly to lead the Washington offense.

The pitching: Zimmermann entered the game with wins of 1-0 against Cincinnati and 2-0 against Atlanta before shutting down the tough Detroit lineup. Zimmermann went almost exclusively with a four-seam fastball and slider, telling reporters that his changeup and curve didn't feel right. Zimmerman slogged through tough times early. After the Detroit leadoff hitter, Austin Jackson, lined out to right to start the game, Torii Hunter reached on an error by Washington first baseman Adam LaRoche. The Tigers usually make the pitcher pay for errors, and Miguel Cabrera made a bid to do it, but his line drive was caught by shortstop Ian Desmond going to his right. Hunter, who had to think the ball was going through, was thrown out off first base by Desmond.

Fielder led off the second against Zimmermann by smashing a curve off the center field fence for a double. But Andy Dirks and Jhonny Peralta each beat pitches into the ground for outs and Fielder didn't advance before the Tigers were out of the inning. With two out in the third, Hunter doubled to left off a slider and Cabrera ripped a fastball into right field to drive in Hunter. But Zimmermann worked out of it by walking Fielder and striking out Dirks swinging at a slider. After that, Zimmerman cruised through the next four innings, giving up three hits and retiring the side in order twice.

Sanchez entered the game 8-0 lifetime against the Nationals and he deserved a better fate in this one. One of the runs against him scored on a sacrifice fly, another scored on an unlikely homer and another scored on a throwing error. Sanchez worked around a couple infield hits in the second inning against the Tigers defense, which is never quite tight. The infield hits loaded the bases with two outs, but Zimmerman was due up and he grounded into a force out. Sanchez pitched well enough to win, but he didn't receive enough offensive or defensive support from himself or his teammates

The hitting: Starting Harper with soft stuff isn't always the best idea. In the third, Harper batted with one out and Denard Span on third after triple. The Tigers played the infield up and Sanchez threw a changeup (86 MPH), hoping for a ground ball. Instead, Harper lifted it into left field for a sacrifice fly, giving the Nats a 1-0 lead. In the fifth, Sanchez started Harper with a curve (81 MPH), which Harper deposited into the right field seats to give the Nats a 3-1 lead. Detroit catcher Alex Avila told reporters that it was the first curve Harper saw in the game, adding that one doesn't normally expect that first curve of the game on the first pitch of an at-bat to leave the yard. Most hitters aren't looking for the curve ball there. But Nationals manager Davey Johnson said in his postgame press conference Harper doesn't have to go up looking for the curve because he tracks the ball so well that he can adjust quickly. Harper is hitting .313 with 10 homers and 20 RBI.

The base running: You wouldn't expect LaRoche to beat Hunter's right field arm from second to third, and that's not exactly what happened in the fourth inning, either. With runners at first and second and one out in the Washington fourth, Kurt Suzuki flied out to Hunter in medium right. Surprisingly, LaRoche took off for third. Hunter made a strong throw, but it bounced off the infield grass by the third base cutout, struck LaRoche's arm on the way up and caromed over third baseman Cabrera's head. Sanchez admitted to being late backing up the play. The ball went into a camera well attached to the third base dugout and LaRoche was awarded a base for the overthrow, which plated him to give the Nats a 2-1 lead. LaRoche explained to reporters after the game that he took the chance because Zimmerman was due up with two outs, so third base was worth a try. That aside, forcing the Tigers to throw the ball around is never a bad strategy, though it didn't always work. In the first inning, Span got himself picked off at first base by Sanchez after starting the game with a single.

The fielding: Besides Sanchez not backing up Hunter's throw at third, the Tigers had some other moments. Span's single fell between the shortstop, left fielder and center fielder. The Tigers had a play on third against Span when he tripled in the third, but second baseman Omar Infante's relay from right wasn't even close, forcing Cabrera well up the left field line. Two straight infield hits in the second could have cost the Tigers, but they didn't. With two out and a runner on first in the Washington second, Danny Espinosa bunted in front of the plate and Avila couldn't pounce in time to throw him out at first. Next up, Suzuki hit a soft single that never passed the infield grass in front of shortstop. The bases were loaded. Both are tough defensive plays, especially the second, but the Tigers don't have defensive playmakers at those positions. The Tigers got out of it, anyway. Zimmerman, the next hitter, batted into a force out to end the inning.

Strategic moves: On April 26, Zimmermann threw a complete game, 1-0 shutout at the Reds, giving up four hits and throwing just 91 pitches. On May 1, Zimmermann threw eight shutout innings at Atlanta, allowing two hits and striking out eight in 107 pitched. Wednesday, Zimmerman was at 101 pitches, 72 strikes, through seven innings. Johnson said he thought about sending Zimmermann against the Tigers in the eighth, but, because of a Tuesday rainout, Zimmermann was on a week of rest instead of the usual four days. The first Tigers due up in the eighth were Cabrera and Fielder. So, Johnson just went to the pen for fresh arms -- Tyler Clippard in the eighth and Rafael Soriano in the ninth. It worked, as it usually does.

Clippard gave the Tigers a chance in the eighth, walking Dirks and Peralta with two out and Avila coming up. Avila hit a two-run homer in Houston to beat the Astros last Friday night. The left-handed hitting catcher also is batting .186 -- .211 against right handers and .067 against lefties. Tigers manager Jim Leyland said in the Detroit Free Press that he probably would have sent Victor Martinez up against a left hander, but, in this case, he said he hoped Avila "runs into one" like he did in Houston. Avila struck out swinging at a 94 MPH fastball from Clippard, but Leyland said he was satisfied that Avila got a couple good swings.

What now: Washington (18-15) remains two games behind Atlanta, which beat Cincinnati, 7-2. Detroit (19-12) remains 1 1/2 games ahead of Kansas City, which lost to Baltimore, 5-3. The Tigers remain an impressive 8-4 against clubs at or above .500. The Nationals are 9-12 against those teams. The Nationals and Tigers will finish off this rain-shortened, two-game series Thursday (1:05 PST). The Tigers' scheduled starter, Doug Fister (4-0, 2.48) hasn't thrown a clunker all year. Washington starter Dan Haren (3-3, 5.01) has thrown some clunkers, but he lasted a combined 14 innings in his last two starts against good hitting clubs (Cincinnati and Atlanta), allowing only three earned runs.

Detroit Tigers do it with smart money

We hear a lot about big league baseball teams spending foolishly. We do not hear that about the Detroit Tigers, who spend intelligently even when their contracts don't work out. Which means that the smart money is picking the Tigers to prevail in the American League Central.

Miguel Cabrera, the 2012 American League triple crown winner, is one example, among many, of the  Detroit Tigers being smart with their money (Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license).


By BILL PETERSON
Big Leagues in Los Angeles

The Detroit Tigers of 2013 stand to illustrate two central, recurring questions about baseball.

How important is defense? And how important is the relief closer?

However, the Tigers are raising no questions about who will win the American League's Central Division. It's going to be them. No other club in this group of Midwestern markets combines local resources with a commitment to winning so completely as the Tigers, who won the 2012 AL pennant before getting themselves swept out of a four-game World Series by the San Francisco Giants.

Between owner Mike Ilitch and general manager David Dombrowski, the Tigers have quite an ambitious combination in their front office. Ilitch is 82, he's worth $2.7 billion and he would rather win a World Series than take it all with him. Dombrowski is at the top of the heap as general managers go. But for the 1994 players strike, a cash-strapped Montreal club that he played a large part in developing as their former general manager could have won it all. He did win it all in 1997 with the Florida Marlins. When Dombrowski moved over to the Tigers in 2002, looking to revive a feckless operation, he left the Marlins with key elements for their 2003 World Series winner. That very year, 2003, as Dombrowski's old team won it all, his new team finished 43-119, most losses in American League history. Three years later, the Tigers were prohibitive favorites in the World Series, though they lost it to St. Louis. The Tigers were back last year and lost again. But they seem to be getting closer.

The Tigers are spending $150 million on players for 2013. In this division, the Tigers act like the big market team, and they do it effectively. They've taken up a habit of signing a good free agent every winter, and their track record in recent trades is hard to surpass.

The larger market is in Chicago, where the White Sox spend enough to win ($120 million this year), but they don't go the extra mile to stay with the Tigers. The White Sox have put together their usual "good enough" team this year. If the ball bounces their way, they'll win 90 and contend for a playoff spot. If the ball bounces the other way, they'll win 78, which is about fourth place. If the bounces are about even, they'll finish in the low 80s. That's always the prediction for the White Sox.

The White Sox like to go with their own guys, which, everyone agrees, is cost effective and morally upright. And it's true that there's no correlation between spending and winning. However, that's only because there's a big difference between smart money and dumb money. The correlation between smart money and winning is very high.

A study of some sort would be necessary for truly making that case, but the Tigers are a fine example of what "smart money" means (For a discussion of “dumb money,” we’ll soon enough consider the Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim). The Tigers’ money hasn't been especially lucky, but it has been effective and well considered.

For example, they played in the World Series last year with more than $15 million gone bust between the injured Victor Martinez and the ineffective Jose Valverde (Insurance reportedly covered about half of Martinez's $13 million salary, and the Tigers were out the $9 million that went to Valverde). But even in hindsight, knowing that Martinez wasn’t around and Valverde clunked so badly that Tigers manager Jim Leyland didn’t want to use him in the World Series, those were smart contracts.

In 2011, Valverde tossed a 2.24 ERA with 49 saves, leading his league in saves for the third time in five years. Due largely to Valverde’s performance, the Tigers won 95 games, easily captured the AL Central and advanced to the league championship series. The Tigers had a $9 million option for Valverde in 2012. Who wouldn't have picked up that option? So, it didn’t work out. And the Tigers took almost no nick last year with the Martinez contract. After insurance, he cost around $6.5 million, about a nickel of the Tigers payroll. Martinez drove in 103 runs in 2011, he’s back now for the last half of his four-year, $50 million contract, and he gives the Tigers a switch-hitting producer in the designated hitter slot, where a surprising number of teams lack any kind of juice.

The story of the 2013 Tigers really begins with the 2008 Tigers, who were basically the same team as the 2006 Tigers who went to the World Series, except the 2008 version finished last in the AL Central and paid out $138 million instead of the 2006 club's $82 million payroll. Knowing a bloated loser when they see one, the Tigers didn’t blow up the whole thing, slink into youth mode and plead with their fans for patience. Instead, they retrenched quickly at the major league level.

Within two years, the Tigers turned over their whole pitching staff, except for Justin Verlander. Within three years, they turned over their entire batting order, except for Miguel Cabrera, which started them on two straight division titles with a clear shot at a third. And their 2012 payroll that went to the World Series was $132 million, less than the Tigers paid for a last-place team four years earlier.

The Tigers are making progress, going to the AL championship series in 2011 and going to the World Series in 2012. They have to go right with the Texas Rangers and New York Yankees as the top AL clubs of the last three years, and those other two clubs are looking a little down this year, but the Tigers aren't. Like the Tigers in 2012 and 2011, the Tigers in 2013 look better than the year before.

Before the 2010 season, the Tigers made one of the master trades of recent years, moving Curtis Granderson to the New York Yankees and Edwin Jackson to the Arizona Diamondbacks in a three-way deal that brought back Austin Jackson from New York and Max Scherzer from Arizona. The same deal also gave the Tigers two relievers, Phil Coke and Daniel Schlereth. The implications of that trade for the Tigers are as deep as the implications of any trade for any club in at least this century.

Not only did the trade make the Tigers younger and better, not only did it more than replace Granderson in center field and Edwin Jackson as a No. 2 starter, but it also saved the Tigers more than $40 million in payroll over the next three years. With those savings, the Tigers had some of the flexibility to sign Valverde in 2010, Martinez in 2011, Prince Fielder in 2012, and Torii Hunter in 2013.

When the Tigers made the three-way deal, they owed Granderson $23.75 million through 2012 and $38.75 million through 2013. Edwin Jackson was due for three years of arbitration, for which he earned $24.35 million. Add them together, and the Tigers would have paid Granderson and Jackson $48.1 million for the three seasons through 2012. Instead, the Tigers paid the four players they received a nudge less than $8 million, total, for those three seasons. And, unlike the Yankees or Diamondbacks, the Tigers played in two LCSs and one World Series in those three years.

We can half-legitimately add 2013 to that equation because Granderson was under contract for it and Jackson was due for free agency. If we want to play that game, we can figure in Granderson's $15 million for this year and Jackson's $13 million, which is his annual salary for his four-year free-agent deal with the Chicago Cubs. Comparing that $28 million in 2013 with the $12.565 million the Tigers are playing the four players they received in the trade, that's more than $15 million in additional savings, if we want to look at it that way. If, for 2013, we just want to consider Granderson and not Jackson, which is more honest, then the Tigers still saved an additional $2.435 million in the exchange.

Following the 2010 season, another big salary, $17 million, came off the Tigers' books with the expiration of their contract with Magglio Ordonez. The Tigers re-signed Ordonez for $10 million in 2011, but then that number came off their balance sheet, as well.

By these adjustments, we can safely say the Tigers trimmed $50-55 million from their 2010-2012 payrolls. During those same three years, they paid Verlander, Cabrera and Fielder a combined $122 million, for which they received seven individual seasons of Hall of Fame productivity. Not that it's exactly the same thing, but any team presented with a veteran Hall of Fame quality free agent at seven years for $122 million before the 2010 season would have signed that paper before the player's agent sobered up.

And when you consider that the Tigers defrayed at least $50 million of that, mostly through the Granderson trade, they come out even better. By comparison, the best free agent contract of 2010 probably would have to be the eight-year, $136 million deal the St. Louis Cardinals signed with Matt Holliday. The worst was the New York Mets and their five-year, $80 million contract with Jason Bay.

We hear a lot about bad contracts in the game, but we don't hear much about the Tigers signing them. They pay players top dollar and the players return it with top dollar production.

Entering the 2008 season, the Tigers signed Cabrera for eight years at $152.3 million, right after they traded four players of minor distinction (the best was Cameron Maybin) to pick him from Florida along with Dontrelle Willis. The Tigers also immediately signed Willis, for three years at $29 million, and he's only won four games in the big leagues since then. Well, there's an exception to every rule. But Cabrera has been so good that the Tigers have easily won that trade, anyway. His worst year under that deal was 2008, when he hit 37 homers with 127 RBI and a .292 average. In the middle of a contract like that, a lot of guys might pace themselves a little. Last year, in the middle of his contract, Cabrera won the triple crown.

Last winter, the Tigers knew they would be out Martinez. But Prince Fielder was on the market. So was Albert Pujols. The Angels ended up signing Pujols, a right-handed hitter entering his age 30 season after declining in 2011. They gave him 10 years at $240 million. The Tigers signed Fielder, the consolation prize, a left-handed hitter entering his age 28 season and coming off an uptick performance in 2011. They gave him nine years at $214 million. Pretty easy to argue right now that the Tigers made the better signing.

Torii Hunter is 37 now and he isn't Spiderman, anymore, but he's still pretty strong in the outfield and he has been a better and more consistent hitter in his thirties than he was in his twenties. The Tigers signed him before this season for two years at $26 million. By comparison, they certainly could have played for B.J. Upton, who wound up with the Braves for five years at $72.5 million. The Tigers made the better deal.

This spring, the Tigers signed Verlander to a five-year contract extension that will pay him $28 million per year from 2015 through 2019. A lot of money that is, but Verlander is a franchise player, probably in the very broad sense of becoming an historically great player for that franchise. The Tigers might gnash their teeth fearing an injury, but they have no worries about his value otherwise. He clearly wants to be that guy, and he apparently knows how to be that guy.

The standard worries about the Tigers are their infield defense and their bullpen. Fielder is notoriously lucky to field a hotly batted ball at first base, Omar Infante made nine errors in 61 games he played for them at second base last year, Jhonny Peralta is in the bottom half defensively at shortstop and Cabrera exceeded very low expectations last year at third base. But Fielder and Cabrera hit so much that they almost made up for all of that.

It’s common to point out that the Tigers were second to last in defensive efficiency last year at .678. But it's less common to note that the Tigers had fewer defensive chances (5,872) than any other American League club last year, which is largely because the Tigers pitching staff was second in strikeouts (1,318). Tigers pitchers got so many hitters out by themselves that the shabbiness of their defense almost came out in the wash.

For now, the bullpen is a problem, 1-4 with a 4.53 ERA in 2013 through April 21. Only three saves, which comes to one each for Coke, Drew Smyly, and Joaquin Benoit. For now, Leyland is just trying to piece it together. But if he can't make it work, don't worry. They'll find somebody.

That's because the Tigers are smart money.

Angels hits, missing in April, showing up now

Weeks ago, the Angels couldn't hit, and they lost more than they should. Now, the Angels can't pitch, and they win more than they should. What happened to all those hits the Angels didn't get in April? They are getting them now.

By BILL PETERSON
Big Leagues in Los Angeles

For sheer versatility in a baseball team, you can't beat the Angels. About six weeks ago, it seemed every game they were in was a pitchers duel, and the Angels lost more than they should. Now, every game they're in is a slugfest, and the Angels win more than they should.

It's not the optimum situation for the Angels, who will fight with the Baltimore Orioles three more times at the Big A this weekend before taking a breather for the All-Star break. They would like more security about their starting rotation, which used to be about 80 percent reliable and now is more like 50 percent reliable. One figures that Jered Weaver and C.J. Wilson will succeed in their turns, but the rest has become trouble.

Dan Haren finally had to give in and go to the disabled list with back trouble that has plagued him all season. His effectiveness has been limited to 6-8, 4.79. Ervin Santana's effectiveness has been even more limited, to 4-9 and 5.75. The bad news there, perhaps, is that Santana's trouble doesn't have a physical explanation, so far as we know. Haren and Santana have, between them, pitched 207 innings of the 735 1/3 innings logged so far by the staff, about 28 percent of the innings. But they have combined to give up 36 homers, nearly half of the 75 home runs allowed by the entire staff.

Further into the rotation, we find Garrett Richards, a young right hander who is going to struggle from time to time. And the Angels still don't know when their No. 5 starter, Jerome Williams, is coming off the disabled list.

But the Angels still won the first of four with the Orioles Thursday night, 9-7. Finally, the Angels' offense is paying them back for all those misfires at the start of the season. They weren't as poor of a hitting club as they appeared when they were losing 3-2 all the time, and now they're not as good of a hitting team as they appear while they win 9-7.

Angels pitchers have allowed 60 runs in their last eight games. In the general run of baseball, that's an eight-game losing streak. At best, one would expect six losses in those eight games. But the Angels actually have won four of them, even though they scored only 46 runs.

Though the Angels began the year with starting pitching as their strongest component, the bats are carrying them through this most victorious stretch of the season. In the last four weeks, June 8-July 5, the Angels are batting .308. In those 25 games, of which the Angels won 17, they have flashed a well rounded offense with 33 homers and 26 steals in 31 attempts. The only downside to their offense is an average of 2.7 walks per game, which is up very slightly from the 2.4 walks per game they were averaging when they fired hitting coach Mickey Hatcher in mid-May.

This surge in the Angels' offense coincides with the installation of Torii Hunter as the No. 2 hitter in Colorado on June 8. A month earlier, of course, along came Mike Trout, the closest thing we have in the game to Rickey Henderson right now, and he took over the leadoff position. Then, Albert Pujols began to hit in the No. 3 hole. And then it became a really sharp idea to slide Hunter into the No. 2 position, because he doesn't just hit the ball to right field, but he hits the ball hard to right field.

Now, with Kendrys Morales hitting cleanup and Mark Trumbo in the No. 5 position, this top half of the Angels batting order can produce with anybody. Behold the numbers for Trout through Trumbo, one through five, from June 8 until now:

Player	AB	R	H	2B	3B	HR	RBI	BB	IBB	SO	HBP	SH	SF	GDP	SB	CS	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS	BAbip
Trout	104	29	39	6	0	5	16	10	0	24	1	0	2	0	17	0	.375	.427	.577	1.004	.442
Hunter	94	18	29	1	0	4	18	5	0	21	1	0	1	4	2	0	.309	.347	.447	.793	.357
Pujols	94	18	32	8	0	5	18	11	4	9	2	0	2	3	3	0	.340	.413	.585	.998	.329
Morales	71	6	21	5	0	1	9	3	0	18	2	0	0	2	0	0	.296	.342	.408	.751	.385
Trumbo	100	13	25	1	2	8	24	6	2	20	1	0	0	3	0	1	.250	.299	.540	.839	.236

On the question of whether replacing Hatcher with Jim Eppel has made a material difference in the club's offense, we offer no answers. However, at least coincidentally, the Angels are a much different and better offensive team in the seven weeks since the change. Take a look at this table showing the Angels' per-game averages and rate stats in games through May 15, when Hatcher was fired, along with the same numbers for the games since then:

Games	AB	R	H	2B	3B	HR	RBI	BB	IBB	SO	HBP	SH	SF	GDP	SB	CS	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Through May 15	33.4	3.6	8.4	1.6	0.1	0.9	3.4	2.4	0.1	6.7	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.8	0.5	0.1	.250	.301	.379	.680
Since May 15	34.6	5.1	9.9	1.7	0.2	1.2	4.8	2.9	0.2	6.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.8	1.0	0.3	.287	.344	.451	.795

Between hits and walks, the Angels are putting two more men on base every day, and now they're hitting an extra home run for every three they used to hit. If one or two of those extra runners is on when one of those extra homers comes up, it changes a game. Notice also that the Angels are way up in their base stealing efforts, which is getting them over, and their sacrifice flies, which is getting them in.

Of course, Hatcher and Eppel have less to do with this than Trout, Hunter, Pujols and company. If you were ever worried that the Angels would get back those hits they didn't get in April, they're getting them back now. And just when they need them.

Pujols debut marks just the start for Angels

Despite frequent predictions of imminent glory, the real payout from the Angels' acquisition of Albert Pujols should come some time after 2012.

By BILL PETERSON
Big Leagues in LA

The Angels aren't the Angels anymore. They are Albert Pujols and whatever the Angels can put around him. It's a proven approach. The St. Louis Cardinals won two world championships that way.

How the Angels build around Pujols will be their story for this and the next several seasons. The Angels take on big contracts every year. The whole promise of Pujols is that he is a different kind of contract, a different kind of player, an anchor who can hold a team through rough waters. But he is not a one-man team and the team he joins now is two years removed from its last finish less than ten games down in the American League West.

The Angels start their season at home Friday night against the Kansas City Royals. Pujols will bat third and play first base. He will be the best player on the field. But he's not, yet, the definitive centerpiece of his team. He is a solution in the midst of a problem. Right now, he's a huge contract added to the Angels' stack of contracts, some of which are among the worst in the game. When you realize the Angels are on the hook to Vernon Wells for $21 million in each of the next three years, that $240 million over ten years for Pujols doesn't sound like such a desperate overbid.

According to Cot's Contracts, the Angels are paying Pujols only $12 million in 2012 -- less than they are paying Wells, Torii Hunter ($18 million), Jered Weaver ($14 million) and Dan Haren ($12.75 million). Close behind is Ervin Santana ($11.2 million).

After 2012, contracts for Hunter, Bobby Abreu ($9 million in 2012), Erick Aybar ($5.08 million) and Maicer Izturis ($3.8 million) expire. The Angels will have 2013 options for Haren ($15.5 million), Santana ($13 million) and Chris Iannetta ($5 million). They also will have arbitration decisions to make about Kendrys Morales, Jerome Williams, Alberto Callaspo and Hisanori Takahashi.

If the Angels pick up all of those 2013 contract options, they would end this season with around $450 million in salary exposure for future years ending in 2021, the last year of the Pujols deal. That's about $50 million per year for the next nine years. Their new television contract with Fox, reportedly $3 billion over 20 years, pays $150 million per year, $100 million per year more than their old deal. They can cover it.

For all their big contracts right now, in other words, the Angels have incredible flexibility for the future seasons of their contact with Pujols. If the Angels play their cards right, this 2012 club won't be close to their best club in the next ten years. Once the Angels shed their contractual commitments to decaying veterans and replace them with live players, they will take off.

The task of building these clubs nominally goes to General Manager Jerry DiPoto, hired last October, six weeks before the club signed Pujols. With the Angels, though, who calls the shots is as interesting as the shots that are called. Owner Arte Moreno is a big-picture, strong-willed sort who has been influential in recent free agent signings. Manager Mike Scioscia also is known as a strong voice in player personnel moves.

That process has only just begun. Fans should not be surprised if the Angels can't overtake the Texas Rangers this year. They still have a distance to cover. The Angels who Pujols joins have less punch than the Cardinals he left behind.

The Angels who Pujols joins are a solid ten games inferior to the Rangers, as demonstrated by two consecutive seasons ending exactly that way. So, that ten-game difference isn't some random fluxuation of statistical probability. It's the difference between the Rangers and Angels when Pujols signed.

Pre-Pujols, the Angels had one, and only one, strong feature -- the starting rotation front three of Weaver, Haren and Santana. The bullpen was shaky, and still is. Around the regular lineup, the Angels had one, and only one, position -- second base with Howie Kendrick -- for which they did not need an upgrade to average major league productivity for a regular at that position. Pujols brings them up to two.

It's true that the Angels signed C.J. Wilson off the Rangers, improving themselves while weakening their nemesis. We'll see if the Rangers made up for it on their end by going to Japan for Yu Darvish. And don't be too surprised, by the way, if Wilson ends up closing games for the Angels, because a chance remains that they will need someone to do it, and Wilson has done it well.

The Rangers aren't going away quietly. They are an angry, hungry group after two straight pennants without a world championship to show for it. They came within one out of winning it all last year. They've got the ethos to get it done, starting at the very top with the great Nolan Ryan, and they have assembled a much better club for doing it. They’re a serious operation. They're not packing it in over a good offseason for the Angels. They have money, too.

The Angels have just begun to build a true challenger by signing Pujols. They've got intriguing young talents like Mark Trumbo and Mike Trout, and aging pieces like Hunter, Wells and Abreu are starting to fall away.

Pujols will put a jolt into this staggering offense this year. But he doesn't have enough help.  We all remember that he one-manned the Cardinals to gold in 2006, but that was an 82-win team in a weak division prevailing by guile. The more formidable Cardinals of the Pujols years included one or two additional top-notch producers. The Angels don't have that. They won three straight divisions, 2007-2009, basing their offense on expensive veteran star outfielders whose decline we have since witnessed with our own eyes. Only when that team crumbles away and we see a new team built around Pujols will we see the Angels with whom he makes his true mark.

The 2012 season will be a year of transition in Anaheim. It might even be victorious. But for that to happen, Pujols will not be enough and the Angels still probably don’t have enough to go with him. They still need some players reversing the aging process, or some other players accelerating the maturation process. That’s this year. Next year and beyond, they’re going to need new players to go with Pujols.